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Terror attacks have been linked in part to online extremist content. Online conversations are cloaked in religious
ambiguity, with deceptive intentions, often twisted from mainstream meaning to serve a malevolent ideology.
Although tens of thousands of Islamist extremism supporters consume such content, they are a small fraction
relative to peaceful Muslims. The efforts to contain the ever-evolving extremism on social media platforms
have remained inadequate and mostly ineffective. Divergent extremist and mainstream contexts challenge
machine interpretation, with a particular threat to the precision of classification algorithms. Radicalization is
a subtle long-running persuasive process that occurs over time. Our context-aware computational approach to
the analysis of extremist content on Twitter breaks down this persuasion process into building blocks that
acknowledge inherent ambiguity and sparsity that likely challenge both manual and automated classification.
Based on prior empirical and qualitative research in social sciences, particularly political science, we model this
process using a combination of three contextual dimensions – religion, ideology, and hate – each elucidating a
degree of radicalization and highlighting independent features to render them computationally accessible.
We utilize domain-specific knowledge resources for each of these contextual dimensions such as Qur’an
for religion, the books of extremist ideologues and preachers for political ideology and a social media hate
speech corpus for hate. The significant sensitivity of the Islamist extremist ideology and its local and global
security implications require reliable algorithms for modelling such communications on Twitter. Our study
makes three contributions to reliable analysis: (i) Development of a computational approach rooted in the
contextual dimensions of religion, ideology, and hate, which reflects strategies employed by online Islamist
extremist groups, (ii) An in-depth analysis of relevant tweet datasets with respect to these dimensions to
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exclude likely mislabeled users, and (iii) A framework for understanding online radicalization as a process to
assist counter-programming. Given the potentially significant social impact, we evaluate the performance
of our algorithms to minimize mislabeling, where our context-aware approach outperforms a competitive
baseline by 10.2% in precision, thereby enhancing the potential of such tools for use in human review.
CCS Concepts: • Information systems→ Information systems applications; Information retrieval; •
Human-centered computing→Collaborative and social computing theory, concepts andparadigms;
Social media; HCI theory, concepts and models; • Applied computing→ Psychology.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: islamist extremism, radicalization, multi-dimensional modeling, contextual
dimensions, user modeling
ACM Reference Format:
Ugur Kursuncu, Manas Gaur, Carlos Castillo, Amanuel Alambo, Krishnaprasad Thirunarayan, Valerie Shalin,
Dilshod Achilov, I. Budak Arpinar, and Amit Sheth. 2019. Modeling Islamist Extremist Communications
on Social Media using Contextual Dimensions: Religion, Ideology, and Hate. 1, 1 (August 2019), 22 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/1122445.1122456
1 INTRODUCTION
In December, 2018 the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)1
met2 in New York focusing on key action items for a global effort to understand the distortions
of the narratives used by terrorists on online platforms. Their subsequent report emphasized that
“terrorist organizations like Da’esh (ISIS) and Al Qaida continue to twist religion to serve their
ends. The threat posed by returning and relocating fighters, as well as from individuals inspired
by them, remains high and has a global reach”. Approximately one thousand Americans between
1980 and 2011 and more than five thousand individuals from Europe through 2015, traveled to
join extremist groups abroad [17]. Since 2011, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported
that 300 Americans attempted or traveled to Syria and Iraq to join extremist groups [41]. Since
March, 2014 at least 182 individuals have been charged in the US for ISIS-related offenses3. Recent
reports [29] suggest that the terror attacks were linked online extremist content, consumed by
supporters as the newly radicalized recruits living in the West are active users of Twitter (e.g., ISIS
supporters had higher activity than 67% of all Twitter users) [13]. Recently, a 24 year old college
student from Alabama became radicalized on Twitter before moving to Syria to join ISIS45. Her
radicalization began when she was 20 through meeting other Muslim community members on
Twitter, which she refers to as theMuslim twittersphere. Self-taught, she read verses from the Qur’an
but interpreted them with others in the twittersphere, persuaded that when the true Islamic State is
declared, it is obligatory to do hijrah, which they see as the pilgrimage to ’the Islamic State’. The
lack of adequate knowledge about the religion combined with the extremist ideology on Twitter
led her to regrettable decisions and actions.
Much has been written on how effectively violent terrorist networks, most notoriously ISIS, have
utilized social media to recruit new members [58]. Nevertheless, efforts to capture systematically
the ever-evolving dynamics of extremism on social media platforms have remained inadequate:
limited in scope, opaque in approach, and mostly ineffective in practice678[6, 25, 34]. Further, as
1https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force
2https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-12-06/un-global-counter-terrorism-compact-coordination-committee-remarks
3GW Extemism Tracker: ISIS in America (May 2019) https://extremism.gwu.edu/isis-america
4https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/podcasts/the-daily/isis-american-women.html
5https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/islamic-state-american-women.html
6https://www.lawfareblog.com/marginalizing-violent-extremism-online
7https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/19/britain-has-large-audience-for-online-jihadist-propaganda-report-says
8https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-New-Netwar-2.pdf
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Islamist extremism is a subjective concept with serious repercussions for individuals, the analysis
of this topic imposes significant social responsibility in designing reliable algorithms, to avoid
discriminatory or biased classification. Merely knowing that someone is a Muslim should not label
him or her as a religious extremist. Therefore, domain expertise and responsible use of knowledge
provides decisive context.
In this study, we model such religious extremist communications on Twitter based on highly
persuasive content, incorporating domain-specific knowledge with three distinct contextual dimen-
sions: religion (R), extremist Islamist ideology (I) and hate (H), originating from domain expert’s
analysis of the data (see Section 4) as well as social science literature [38, 51, 57] in consultation
with our domain expert co-author. The religion dimension refers to Muslim attitudes that range
from “mainstream” through more “extreme” interpretations of Islamic scriptures. Attitudes toward
political extremist ideology (i.e., Islamism) are another prevalent dimension of extremism. The
conceptualization and measurement of variations in political and ideological attitudes toward
Islamism are drawn from [1]’s (concept building) study of Political Islamism. Finally, hate speech
or attitudinal support for violence is the third critical dimension that provides a benchmark for
Islamist extremism with the potential for violent terrorist acts [32, 33]. Our approach will further
enable an analysis of the radicalization process individually and collectively in a fine-granular
manner, to provide a computational foundation for any form of human intervention. Our hypoth-
esis is that the combination of these three contextual dimensions will create more coherent and
distinctive representation of extremist communications, improving the performance of classifica-
tion. Accordingly, we address the following research questions: RQ1: Does incorporation of these
contextual dimensions into representation of social media communications improve extremist
content classification performance?RQ2:Which combination of the dimensions are more effective?
RQ3: How much does each of these dimensions contribute to the classifier performance?
To achieve these goals, we perform an in-depth analysis of datasets that contain verified Islamist
extremist accounts (see Section 3.2 for details). We operationalize abstract models of behavior
exhibited by an extremist individual under the influence of religion, extremist ideology, and hate.
We generate representations for different contextual dimensions using word embeddings drawn
from domain-specific resources, to render these dimensions computationally accessible. We then
address the challenging problems of inherent sparsity and ambiguity in relations that are implicit in
this data to obtain reliable results. Further, language and topical analyses characterize the similarity
between users that we can scrutinize, and hierarchical clustering identifies outlier individuals
that otherwise would mislead the analysis. Finally, we model Islamist extremist communications
utilizing supervised classification algorithms operating over domain-specific representations of
extremist and non-extremist users generated by incorporating the three contextual dimensions
mentioned above.
In this pursuit, our study makes the following four specific contributions: (i) Development of a
computational approach rooted in the dimensions of religion, extremist ideology, and hate that
are employed by online Islamist extremist groups to influence, (ii) an in-depth data analysis of
relevant datasets with respect to these dimensions, demonstrating improvement in classification
with ideological and hate contents, (iii) a framework for understanding online radicalization that
serves as a basis for counter programming, (iv) potentially significant reduction in discriminatory
bias of mislabeling mainstream (non-extremist) Muslim accounts as extremist9. As precision in
classifying the communications on Islamist extremism takes precedence over recall to interpret a
response properly, we evaluate precision to emphasize minimizing mislabeled non-extremist users.
9Mainstream adherents to Islam number ∼1.8 billion, while only a small fraction of them adopt extremist views.
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/
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Our approach outperforms a competitive baseline by 10.2% in precision and 8.5% in recall leading
to an improvement of 10.7% in F1-score. The combination of all three contextual dimensions in the
representation of an account outperforms other alternatives.
In Section 2, we provide details on existing research related to Islamist extremism on social media.
In Section 3, we describe the preliminary concepts used in this study. Section 4 characterizes the
dataset through language, topical, statistical and similarity analyses, which inform our subsequent
modeling approach. We discuss the detailed modeling of Islamist extremism in Section 5, and the
evaluation of results and its implications in Section 6. Finally, we present our conclusions with
future directions in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
The state of the art approaches to detecting and analyzing Islamist extremist communications on
social media are limited in their selection of features due to the sparsity and ambiguity inherent
in social media data. We need novel approaches to learn coherent representations of content by
making use of contextually relevant domain knowledge in a principled manner.
Previous research related to Islamist extremism on social media has focused on four problems:
(i) detection of extremist content [8, 35, 47], (ii) prediction of extremist users [7, 26–28, 46, 59], (iii)
detection of communities for extremist users [5, 9, 49, 50] and (iv) identification of hate promoting
extremism [2–4, 21, 55]. We categorize this study as detection of extremist content and prediction
of extremist users.
Ferrara et al. [28] proposed a framework to predict extremist users, their adoption of extremist
content, and interaction reciprocity between extremists and regular users. They built predictive
models for a binary classification of extremist users using Random Forest (RF) and Logistic Regres-
sion (LR) algorithms. To predict extremist users, they employed 52 features that include user and
tweet metadata as well as information related to user network and temporal evolution of content.
They performed prediction of adoption of extremist viewpoints (as a result of being influenced)
based on the behavior of regular users retweeting the content from extremist users. The prediction
of interactions with extremists (indicating more active involvement) was based on reply tweets.
For all three prediction tasks, RF outperformed LR, with AUCs (Area Under the ROC Curve) of
0.87, 0.77 and 0.69 for the prediction of extremist users, adoption and interactions, respectively.
Rowe et al. [46] performed an analysis of 154K Twitter users in order to extract cues related to
radicalization from their content, based on whether the users favor pro vs anti-extremist stances.
They found that 727 of these users displayed a pro-ISIS stance, particularly when an event related
to ISIS unfolded. In another study, a graph-based semantic approach for detection of radicalization
in the Twitter content was proposed by [47]. They utilized knowledge graphs (e.g., DBpedia) to
provide semantic relationships between the extracted entities in the content, improving robustness
over prior approaches that involved lexical, sentiment, topic and network features. They applied
their approach to 1132 (566 pro / 566 anti-ISIS) users, with 1.9M (0.6M pro / 1.3M anti-ISIS) tweets,
achieving an F1-score of 0.92.
Fernandez et al. [27] developed an approach for detection and prediction of the influence a user
is exposed to, by combining social and computational models of radicalization. They compared
the radicalization level of 112 pro-ISIS v/s 112 “general” Twitter users with respect to the roots
of radicalization at the individual (micro), community (meso) and global (macro) levels. Their
approach achieved up to a 0.90 F1-score for detection and between 0.70 and 0.80 precision for
prediction, utilizing vector representations of users designed based on their three level approach.
In a follow-up study, Fernandez et al. [26] utilized contextual semantic features of radical content
on social media employing ontologies and knowledge bases (DBpedia and Wikidata) to capture
categories, topics, entities and entity types. They tested the effectiveness of extracting semantic
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context from radical conversations on classification of pro-ISIS and non pro-ISIS accounts. They
achieved an improvement in precision, recall and F1-score of 0.04, 0.04 and 0.03, respectively.
In contrast to this literature, our work is grounded in the social science literature and incorporates
domain-specific resources [30, 31, 52] in the model to better understand and detect extremist content
using linguistic approaches. As Islamist extremism is a complex issue that involves different contexts,
traditional approaches do not adequately capture important nuances in the language related to
the multiple contextual dimensions of the problem. Our approach uncovers these nuances by
decomposing social media posts along the three contextual dimensions (see Section 3.4), and
provides a fine-grained basis for understanding an individual’s progression towards radicalization.
Moreover, this understanding will improve interpretability and serve as a crucial basis for designing
and building counter extremism narratives for possible de-radicalization efforts.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Background: Islamist Extremism On Social Media
Extremist actors involved in the dissemination of persuasive content frequently disguise themselves
as legitimate representatives of a religion, doctrine or ideology (e.g., extremists posing as true
(mainstream) believers in Islam). From the perspective of the persuader, persuasive (propagandist)
messages should resemble messages produced by common agents, but be able to perpetuate
their hidden agenda by deception and foster misinformation by distorting concepts and relations.
This challenges the reliable detection of radicalization content. Such persuasive content involves
unconstrained doctrinal concepts and relationships inspired by religion, history and politics.
For example, the concept “jihad” commonly appears in mainstream Islamic as well as extremist
communications, albeit with different context-dependent interpretations (see Table 1). The concept
of “jihad” can mean (i) self-spiritual struggle, (ii) defensive war to protect lives and property
from aggression, or (iii) acts of provoked or unprovoked violence, depending on its context of
use [23]. Classification of the first and the second interpretation of “jihad” as extreme would
cause the computational model to be gravely incorrect. Further, the degree and progression on a
radicalization scale are reflected in the content. For example, users who are recruiters will have
a tendency to disseminate information to influence/impress their followers, and initially utilize
religious references in their narratives. As they move further in their persuasive radicalization
process, they use extremist ideology propaganda by referring to resources of their ideologues. The
process culminates with inciting violence by utilizing hate speech and encouraging the followers
to act and commit violence. Thus, to glean reliable and comprehensive insights and to assess its
intensity, it is critical to use the three contextual dimensions of Religion(R), Ideology(I) and Hate(H)
to analyze all communication.
As the interpretation of an individual term depends upon its surrounding lexical context, accurate
identification of the relationship between lexical features and Islamist extremism is crucial. For
example (see also Table 1), when the term “jihad” co-occurs with “kill” and “attack”, it connotes hate
and violence. In the presence of “Allah” and “Islam”, the term “jihad” stands for its original meaning
denoting the religious concept of self-struggle. “Jihad” co-occuring with “imam_anwar_al_awlaki”,
who is considered [18] a prominent ideologue of radical Islamist groups, connotes exhorting hate and
violence. The word “jihad” acquires a different meaning in each of the contexts above; therefore, its
representation should be semantically different as well. For this reason, we generate representations
of contents and users based on the three contextual dimensions (Religion, Extremist Ideology and
Hate) that we identified for the domain of Islamist extremism. The representation of contents
is created through word embedding models learned from domain-specific resources, for each
contextual dimension. We provide further details of these procedures in the subsequent subsections.
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No. Extremist Content Examples R I H
1. “Here is the fragrance of Paradise, Here is the field of Jihad. Here is the land of #Islam, Here is
the land of the Caliphate”
✓
2. “Reportedly, a number of apostates were killed in the process. Just because they like it I guess.
#SpringJihad #CountrysideCleanup”
✓
3. “and Jihad means to sacrifice YOURSELF in war to save your country (or religion)” ✓ ✓
4. “I asked about the paths to Paradise It was said that there is no path shorter than Jihad” ✓ ✓
5. “God honored us w/ Jihad Khilafah in this era of Fitnah” ✓
6. “By the Lord of Muhammad (blessings and peace be upon him) The nation of Jihad and
martyrdom can never be defeated”
✓
7. “Anyone who prefers to raise secularism over Islam is a kafir, whether he’s from Saudi, Sudan,
Somalia, Mexico, Burma, Hawaii, or elsewhere.”
✓
8. “#MyJihad is to take care of mother, then mother, then mother, then father, then other relatives
in...”
✓
9. “Kindness is a language which the blind can see and the deaf can hear #MyJihad be kind always” ✓
10. “May Allah accept those who fastMonday’s and Thursday’s.” ✓
Table 1. Example tweets from our dataset for extremist/non-extremist social media users, annotated by our co-author
domain expert for religion (R), extremist ideology (I) and hate (H) terminology. “Jihad” appears in multiple dimensions.
Examples 8 and 9 contain the term “Jihad” in its mainstream meaning, whereas, in Examples 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, it refers to its
meaning in the extremist context. Some of the terms are coded based on their relatedness to one of the three dimensions:
Religion (Bold-faced), Ideology (Italicized) and Hate (Underlined)
3.2 Dataset
Our ground truth dataset includes 538 extremist users and their 47,376 tweets in the positive class
spanning nearly seven years between October 2010 and August 2017. We have used two datasets (i)
tweets of Pro-ISIS users10, and (ii) tweets of users reported by the Lucky Troll Club11 that have
been verified and suspended by Twitter because of ISIS-related supportive activity12[12]. The data
and labels were manually curated by annotators who are experts in the Arabic language and
verified by Twitter’s anti-abuse team. The dataset has also been used in recent studies for modeling
radicalization [27, 28]. From this dataset, we selected only English tweets. In our positive samples,
the prevalent concepts, topics and terms usually refer to key domain-specific entities such as people
(e.g., ideologues, historic person), locations (region, city) and verbs (fight, kill, join). In the rest of
this paper, we refer to the positive examples as “extremist users” and to the negative examples as
“non-extremist users”.
Creation of Negative Class Samples: For development and testing, we use a dataset of 6040
non-extremist mainstreamMuslim religious users and 7000 of their tweets created by Chen et al. [22]
to constitute the negative class. Note that Islamist extremist content and mainstream/non-extremist
content have overlapping vocabulary terms (e.g., jihad) though used in different senses. This word-
sense disambiguation challenges the accurate detection of extremist cues in the content, reducing
precision. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach to disambiguate content, we create the
negative class dataset from a dataset of Muslim religious users. We employ Hierarchical Dirichlet
Processing (HDP) (non-parametric) clustering [56] on the tweets from users to hierarchically
organize users probabilistically based on their content’s topical similarity. The application of HDP
over the 7K tweets resulted in 600 coherent clusters based on 20 topics with 30 sub-topics each
[54]. We treat these clusters as standing for non-extremist users, and randomly select 538 from the
10https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/how-isis-uses-twitter
11http://archive.is/V24aS
12https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603626/data-mining-reveals-the-rise-of-isis-propaganda-on-twitter/
CSCW’19, November 9th-13th 2019, Austin, Texas
Modeling Islamist Extremist Communications on Social Media 7
600-user clusters to create our non-extremist user dataset. This approach allows us to deal with
data sparsity associated with users without sacrificing their coherence from their normal usage.
3.3 Word Embeddings
Generating embeddings of content provides a numerical vector representation that captures the
context of a word/phrase in a corpus. Embedding algorithms including Word2Vec [43], GLoVe
[44] and FastText [10] have proven to be effective for creating rich representations tuned to a
specific domain. Word (or phrase, sentence, document) embedding models generate numerical
vector representations of words (or phrases, sentences, documents) that can be used to represent
the content [37]. We can use vector operations such as addition, multiplication, and concatenation
to aggregate word representations into representations of phrases, sentences, or short documents
such as tweets. Domain-specific words can have frequencies, neighboring words, and usages that
differ significantly. Hence, it is important to learn embeddings based on domain-specific corpora,
e.g., related to Islamist extremism.
3.4 Contextual Dimension Modeling
Highly persuasive religious extremist communications on Twitter frequently employ language
and topical cues related to the religion of Islam (R), extremist Islamist ideology (I) and hate (H) for
effectiveness (see Section 4). The distribution of prevalent terms (i.e., words, phrases, concepts) in
the content of both extremist and non-extremist users reflects different contextual dimensions of the
Islamist extremism problem (see Tables 2 and 3). For example, extremist users often make references
to concepts and terminologies related to extremist ideology and hate language, while they share
content containing relatively fewer Islamic concepts. On the other hand, in the content of non-
extremist users, they more often share content related to the religion of Islam unlike extremist users.
Moreover, the ambiguity of diagnostic terms (e.g., jihad) also mandates representation of terms in
different contexts. Therefore, to better reflect these differences, we create multiple models that will
represent the three contextual dimensions for a reliable analysis. We were guided by authoritative
sources to ground our hypotheses and look to operationalize the approach that was not performed
for social media communications by social scientists. Specifically, [11, 19, 38, 45, 51, 57] show that
extremism and subsequent acts of violence are linked to each of these contexts, describing that
extremist groups create different interpretations of religion that serves their political extremist
ideological interests, inciting hate and finally leading individuals to commit acts of violence. While
[57] found, with context theory, significant positive correlations between cognitive complexity
and extremist ideology, [38] argued that extremists teach their young followers to hate "the West"
forming an ideological premise that they should follow the ‘true’ Islam and it should be considered
above everything. Further, [51] found that there are connections between web sites operated by
extremist and hate organizations and select episodes of violence. In the lights of these findings from
the literature and our observations from our dataset, we identify the three contextual dimensions
by carefully scrutinizing the Islamist extremist communications on Twitter as well as social science
literature in consultation with our domain expert co-author.
We create three word embedding models for the three contextual dimensions, employing domain
specific resources13 as follows: (i) For Religion: The Qur’an English translation14 by Muhammad Taqi-
ud-Din Al-Hilali and Muhammad Muhsin Khan, and Hadith (collection of Prophetic Narrations)
13These resources are available upon request to reproduce our experiments.
14https://www.noblequran.com/translation/
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resources referenced by ISIS the most15: Sahih Al-Bukhari16 and Sahih Muslim17 well-known
authentic Hadith collection, (ii) For Extremist Ideology: Magazines published by ISIS (e.g., Dabiq18,
Rumiyah19), books and transcribed lectures of extremist ideologues identified by our domain
expert co-author (e.g., Anwar Al-Awlaki, Hassan Al-Banna, Said Qutb, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Abul A’la
Maududi), and (iii) For Hate: Hate speech corpus [24]. Figure 1 illustrates the overall flow of creation
of contextual dimension models and representations of a user for each contextual dimension.
Figure 1. Creation of representations for a user using contextual
dimension models using Word2Vec (W2V).
In this study, we use Word2Vec [42] with
skip-grams to generate contextual dimen-
sion models. As we aggregate the tweets
for each user, we take union of unigrams
(U ), bigrams (B), and trigrams (T ), from
tweets of a user, and “average” their word
embeddings to generate an embedding vec-
tor of the user, following the commonly-
used method. We formally define our con-
textual dimension modeling procedure as
follows:
Let us represent a set of words/phrases in
tweets of a user (u) as G which is gen-
erated through the following procedure:
(U \ {B,T }) ∪ (B \ {T }) ∪T ). Then, we gen-
erate representations of a user (u) along the
three contextual dimensions of Religion (R),
Ideology (I), and Hate (H) as follows:
®V(ud ) =
∑
w ∈(G∩W d ) ®νw
|G ∩W d | ,d ∈ Ψ (1)
where, Ψ denotes contextual dimensions, ®V(ud ) represents the embedding vector of a user (u)
generated from a word embedding model for a contextual dimension d having vocabulary Wd, and
w is a word in a tweet of a user u in the vocabulary Wd. The denominator of the Equation 1 is the
cardinality of the set of words in the intersection between tweets of a user (G) and vocabulary of a
dimension (Wd). We generate the embedding of a user along three dimensions as follows:
®V(u) = SVD(V(uR ) ⊕ V(u I ) ⊕ V(uH )) (2)
where (⊕) concatenates the vector representations of a user (u) along the three contextual dimen-
sions: R:V(uR ), I:V(u I ), and H:V(uH ). Then, we utilize singular value decomposition(SVD) to
perform dimensionality reduction [53] which reduces the dimensions to 300, which is standard in
the word embeddings literature [15, 42, 44].
As we argue that such representations of a user involving the three contextual dimensions will be
more coherent and representative, it will disambiguate diagnostic domain-specific words/phrases
providing different representations. Thus, the very same terms with different meanings will be
represented differently as well. To illustrate how the meaning changes in the extremist and non-
extremist content with respect to each contextual dimension, we show the representations of the
15https://www.kaggle.com/fifthtribe/isis-religious-texts
16https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahih_al-Bukhari
17https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sahih_Muslim
18https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dabiq_(magazine)
19https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rumiyah_(magazine)
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Figure 2. The representations of the word “jihad” with different meanings based on different contextual dimensions.
Upper figure: The closest terms to “jihad” in the contexts: religion, ideology and hate for extremist (E) users. Lower figure:
The closest terms to “jihad” in the three contexts: religion, ideology and hate for non-extremist (NE) users.
term “jihad” and its closest terms in Figure 2, for extremist and non-extremist users. In (a), the
closest terms to “jihad”, in the content of extremist users, are related to the concepts that extremist
groups use to justify their ideology. These closest terms include “infidelscotsman”, “behead”, “nasir”,
“takfir” for ideology; “isil”, “fitna”, “houthi”, “invade” for hate; and “aqeedah”, “awlaki”, “shaykh”,
“allahu”, for religion. On the other hand, (b) displays the terms closest to “jihad” that are mostly
related to the mainstream (non-extremist) Islamic terminologies; such as “alhamdulillah”, “islah”,
“righteous” for ideology, “quran”, “muslims”, “imams” for religion, and “terrible”, “attacking”, “hates”
for hate. As the meaning of the word “jihad” changes depending on its context, its numerical
representation changes as well.
4 EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
As noted, Islamist extremism on social media has security implications, and requires careful
judgment and reliable labeling of content and individuals. Hence, before attempting to use our
dataset for modeling Islamist extremism, we examine our dataset carefully, identifying patterns and
potential anomalies, checking our assumptions, and testing our hypothesis. We use a multi-pronged
approach involving lexical, topical, statistical, and user similarity as discussed below.
4.1 N-Gram Analysis
The language characteristics of extremist and non-extremist contents differ with respect to different
contextual dimensions. To determine the language characteristics, we extract n-grams (n=1 to 3)
from tweets of users in extremist and non-extremist datasets using the skip n-grammodel [16, 42]. In
our experiments with n-grams, we have observed that 2- and 3-grams were particularly informative
because multi-word concepts and entities are prevalent in these communications. For example,
“imam anwar al awlaki” occurs often because he is a prominent and popular extremist ideologue.
Moreover, Islamist extremist groups including “Ahrar al-Sham”, “Jabhat al-Nusra”, “Islamic State”
(IS), and locations such as “Deir ez-Zor” once held by ISIS in the Syria and Iraq region are mentioned
frequently.
Among the users in the extremist dataset, terms such as “allah”, “fear allah”, “jannah”, “muslim”,
“attack”, “kill”, “isis”, and “islamic state”, are the most frequent, where the first four terms are related
to the religion of Islam. The terms attack and kill are related to hate, and the last two terms refer
to the most prominent Islamist extremist group (see Table 2). In contrast, among the users in
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N-grams Extremist Users Non-Extremist Users
Unigrams isis, syria, kill, iraq,muslim, allah, attack, break,
aleppo, assad, islamicstate, army, soldier, cynthias-
truth, islam, support,mosul, libya, rebel, destroy,
airstrike
person, majd, opening, belief, follower, knowing,
khazarrose, al-beltagy’s, forza, rally, smyrna, to-
gethernabilahasya, cyrus, islam, okuyamadigimi,
dibawain, waalaikumsalam
Bigrams Caliphate news, islamic state, iraq army, soldier
kill, iraqi army, syria isis, syria iraq, assad army,
terror group, shia militia, isis attack, aleppo syria,
martyrdom operation, ahrar sham, assad regime,
follow support, lead coalition, turkey army, isis
claim, kill isis
sleep controversial, time activist, ali alham-
duillah, pape gratefulness, out violence, inii ri-
ots, anti-muslim fukushima’s, afternoon commit,
agree regimes, #patientsafety personality, mahdi
muslims, movie muslimap, ahmad worried, bibli-
cal festival, jummah soldier, mixe masjid, masmil-
waukee reminder, mubarak title, imams koplok
Trigrams Imam anwar awlaki, video message islamic-
state, fight islamic state, isisclaim responsibility
attack, muwahideen powerful middleeast,
isis tikrit tikritop, amaqagency islamicstate
fighter, sinai explosion target, alone state fighter,
intelligence reportedly kill, khilafahnew is-
lamic state, yemanqaida commander kill, isis
militant hasakah, breakingnew assad army,
isis explode middle, hater trier haleemah, trust
isis tighten, qamishlus isis fighting, defeat enemy
allah, kill terrorist baby, ahrar sham leader
allah bowtie raised, holars killll studios, muham-
mad lingkgan fdraiser, homefeed wajib akal, is-
raeli paid fajr, eradicating nations project, 2500
muslims homicides, suicide espinoza excess, flow
producin shiekh, non-muslims defend reality,
masalah taft makan, beneficial right knalan, push
serious idea, jahannam philosophy prostration,
brotherhood tranquility korean, saturday defile
astagfirullah, quick taught america, bbe quran
goal, alhamdulillah sat week, touching kids
killed, fodation islamic state, islamicate sama-
jhten defined
Table 2. Most prevalent unigrams, bigrams, trigrams in the content of extremist and non-extremist users. The n-grams
related to the religion of Islam, extremist Islamist ideology and hate appear in bold, italics, and underlined, respectively.
the non-extremist dataset, the most frequent n-grams are “amendment yourself”, “#truthmonkey”,
“booth volunteering”, “time activist”, “drink upon”, which reflect their contrasting social/political
communication.
4.2 Topical Analysis
Figure 3. Identification of optimal number of relevant top-
ics based on perplexity and coherence scores. From these
graphs, we identify 90 as an optimal number of topics that
best represent the content of users.
Topics in the content of extremist and non-
extremist users can play a critical role in deter-
mining intra-class similarity and inter-class dif-
ferences among users. We used Latent Dirich-
let Allocation (LDA) over n-grams (n=1-3) to
assess topical similarity of content of extrem-
ist users to characteristics of Islamist extrem-
ism. As LDA is a parametric probabilistic ap-
proach for retrieving topics, the number of top-
ics should be carefully selected to capture the
themes optimally. Hence, we used perplexity
measure to obtain the optimal number of topics
that best represents the content. A higher per-
plexity score implies higher representativeness
and semantic integrity among the topics. Re-
searchers [31] have applied LDA over various
combinations of unigrams (U), bigrams (B), and
trigrams (T) to obtain informative topics. We
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apply this procedure creating three different topic models covering the following combinations:
(i) U, (ii) U+B, (iii) U+B+T (see Section 3.2). Using the perplexity score depicted in Figure 3, we
identified 90 as the threshold for the optimal number of topics for each user for each of the four
topic models. We have also used the same number (90) of topics for non-extremist users. That is,
we did not compute perplexity scores for non-extremist users separately as they were created using
Hierarchical Dirichlet Process (HDP), which is a non-parametric form of LDA.
Dataset (User types) Prevalent Topics
Extremist Users islamic state, syria, isis, kill, allah, video, minute propaganda video scenes, jaish islam release,
restock missile, kaffir, join isis, aftermath,mercy,martyrdom operation syrian opposition, pun-
ish libya isis, syria assad, islam sunni, swat, lose head, wilayatalfurat, somali, child kill, takfir,
jaish fateh, baghdad, iraq, kashmir muslim, capture, damascus, report rebel, british, qala moon,
jannat, isis capture, border cross, aleppo, iranian soldier, tikrit tikrittop, lead shia military kill,
saleh abdeslam refuse cooperate
Non-Extremist Users masjid job kill, smelled valentines day myanmar, black pada newspaper, quran, tarek neces-
sary like lost, radioactive bande khuda delivered, kaiciid united nations between sky, move-
ment, mustafa human reference, dislodge fatir, kids cruise islamophobia language, active
people justice party, hati tiba jihad, abdel lawful farrakhan, adha suhaib, hiasan racist,
darinya alhamdulilah, order u.s. iran strike, light headed narcissist stuff, truth monkey,
protest jihad controversial, moon accept boycott states, arabi fornicate expiration, al-beltagy
rose, khuda jannat, brotherhood maaf, sunni islam, wasidiyah allahumma, muhammad
laws onward walking, desperation rather hugo, okurs show rotinhell, american smurf, abra-
ham killed, shifters controversy military, allah, prophet muhammad, rest peace, iraq asks
bible jerebu
Table 3. Topics extracted from the content of extremist and non-extremist users using LDA and HDP. The topics related
to religion, ideology and hate are bold-faced, italicized and underlined respectively. Remaining topics did not fall under
any particular dimension.
In the content of extremist users, topics related to the Islamist ideology are prevalent compared
to topics related to hate and religion. For instance, Islamist extremist users frequently make use of
ideology-related words/phrases to promote their organization (e.g., “islamic state”, “isis”, “join isis”),
its activities (e.g., “martyrdom operation syrian opposition”) or attacks on non-muslim people (e.g.,
“kaffir”) (see Table 3). On the other hand, topics related to religion are prevalent in the content of
non-extremist users. For instance, non-extremist users invoke religious concepts such as “allah”,
“prophet muhammad”, “quran”, “alhamdulillah” and “jannat”, whereas there is only one reference to
hate, “masjid job kill”. We observe that the prevalence of these topics related to different contextual
dimensions in the content of extremist and non-extremist users varies.
4.3 User Similarity
As observed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, the content of extremist and non-extremist users show strong
dissimilarities in the use of language and the topics of conversations based on extremist Islamist
ideology and hate, whereas they are relatively similar based on religion. Assessment of similarity
between extremist and non-extremist users reveals the contrast between these users with respect
to the three contextual dimensions. Further, assessing similarity between users in each group
(extremist/extremist, non-extremist/non-extremist), shows the coherence of the extremist and
non-extremist datasets, and further allows us to observe potential anomalies if any exist. Hence,
we provide a similarity analysis of users through comparison between pairs of users. We utilize the
embedding representations of such users created through three contextual dimension models (R,
I, H) (see Section 3.4) and measure the distance between them using cosine similarity. In Figures
4, 5, and 6, the heat maps depict user similarity, where similarity values range from 0.0 to 1.0,
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represented using shades of red, with white being 0 and dark red being 1; therefore, the darker
areas correspond to more similar users.
Figure 4. Similarity between extremist (x-axis) and non-extremist users (y-axis) based on religion, ideology and hate
dimensions. User id appears on the x axis for extremist and the y axis for non-extremist users. Extremist and non-extremist
users show strong similarity for religion, and weak similarity for hate. They show stronger similarity based on ideology
compared to hate, but weaker compared to religion.
Figure 4 shows the similarity between extremist and non-extremist users. The pairs of extremist/non-
extremist users (E-N) show strong similarity for religion in Figure 4 (left), while the similarity is
relatively weak for hate in Figure 4 (right). Based on ideology, these pairs of users display significant
similarity in Figure 4 (middle) compared to hate. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that a small
set of pairs for both hate and ideology have stronger similarity compared to other users.
Figure 5. Similarity between extremist users based on a single dimension (religion, ideology and hate). User id appears
on the x and y axes for extremist users. Extremist users display strong similarity among themselves based on religion, while
a small set of extremist users on the x-axis do now show this similarity with other extremist users on the y-axis. A cluster
of users between 250 and 350 on the x-axis for ideology in (middle) and users between 0 and 50 for hate in (right) show
strong similarity with other users. On the other hand, a set of extremist users on the y-axis of (left) triangle-figure and
x-axis of (right) triangle figure do not show any similarity (white cells) with the majority of other extremist users.
Figure 5 depicts similarity among extremist users for religion, ideology and hate contextual
dimensions. In Figure 5 (left), extremist users generally show strong similarity based on religion.
On ideology, while a significant number of extremist users are not similar with each other, a
collection of extremist users between 250 and 350 on the x-axis shows stronger similarity with
other extremist users between 240 and 538 on the y-axis in Figure 5 (middle). In Figure 5 (right),
only a small collection of extremist users between 0 and 50 on the x-axis shows strong similarity
with the majority of other extremist users on the y-axis based on hate. We believe that this is due
to extremist users employing different hate tactics for different targets. When we consider tweets
from users that are “distant” for the hate dimension, their content looks different. For example,
considering the example tweets from Table 1, one extremist user’s tweets might be emboldening
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hatred against "apostates" (i.e., Muslims in other countries who, in the eyes of Islamist extremist
groups, have deserted Muslim ideals, ideology and religion), while another might be about hatred
against “the West”. The context in each of these conversations would be different because of their
target, despite the hatred being incited. It is noteworthy that a spectrum of extremist users between
0 and 100 on the x-axis representing 19% of these extremist users of Figure 5 (left) for religion, and
a collection of disparate users on the y-axis of Figure 5 (right) for hate, do not show any similarity
(white cells) with a significant number of other extremist users on the y-axis. This implies that the
extremist user dataset might contain outliers or mislabeled users as extremist.
Figure 6. Similarity between non-extremist users only based on religion(left), ideology(middle) and hate(right) dimen-
sions. User id appears on the x and y axes for non-extremist users. Non-extremist users are strongly similar to each other
based on religion as well as ideology, while they do not display similarity based on hate.
Figure 6 depicts similarity among non-extremist users for religion and ideology dimensions.
In Figure 6 (left) and (middle), non-extremist users show strong similarity based on religion and
ideology respectively. Note that the darker shade of red does represent the similarity of two users,
but not relatedness of their content to ideology. Hence, strongly similar non-extremist users based
on ideology might still have low relatedness to specific ideological content. In Figure 6 (right),
non-extremist users do not show similarity with each other based on hate.
Observations: Through this exploratory analysis, we make the following observations that
guide our modeling approach: (i) The content of extremist users heavily contains language, topical
and contextual features from Islamist extremist ideology, religion of Islam, and hate speech. (ii)
While extremist and non-extremist users are similar in their appeal to religion, they differ in
their appeal to Islamist extremist ideology and hate. This might be because they employ different
ideological and hate tactics for their targets. (iii) A small subset of extremist users are dissimilar
to other extremist users for religion (see Figure 5), implying that the extremist user dataset may
contain likely outlier users. Hence, we pursue a set of experiments to examine the presence of likely
outliers and their identification in the extremist dataset, as described in Section 5.1
5 METHOD FOR MODELING EXTREMIST AND NON-EXTREMIST USERS
In this section, we explain our modeling approach informed by our observations in Section 4. We
first examine the existence of likely outliers using a chain of techniques. After we identify and
remove likely outlier users in the extremist user dataset, we perform imputation to deal with sparse
representations of users for the three contextual dimensions. Finally, we create and evaluate our
models employing various combinations of contextual dimensions.
5.1 Identification of Outliers
In Section 4.3, we have seen that the extremist dataset might contain anomalous users (potentially
non-extremist), whom we called likely outliers. As described in Section 3.2, sole expertise in the
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Figure 7. Placement of representations of users in contextual dimensions of religion, ideology and hate in 2-D space
using t-SNE (Best seen in color). In (left), which overlays three representations in different coordinates, users show similarity
on their spread over the space based on hate and religion, while a small cluster of users fall far from others. (right) provides
a closer look over random samples of 20 users on the 2-d space. Users A and D (circled) are close to each other for all
contextual dimensions, while they potentially form an outlier cluster of users for hate and religion.
Arabic language or the problem of online abusive behavior would not suffice for reliable labeling
process, as such a complex problem requires deep domain knowledge and expertise. Therefore,
we suspect that the likely outliers that we have observed in the extremist dataset result from
the lack of knowledge and expertise in the problem of Islamist extremism. Especially, given the
immense sensitivity and related security implications of the problem, we undertake a further in-
depth analysis that includes hierarchical clustering and statistical analysis, followed by validation
by our co-author domain expert in the field of religious extremism.
To visualize potential dissimilarity and the presence of likely outliers among the extremist
users with respect to contextual dimensions, we plot representations of extremist users in a two
dimensional space in Figure 7 (left), using T-distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE)
[39]. It demonstrates such dissimilarity, the spread of users over the space, and existence of likely
outlier users for the three contextual dimensions. When we stretch the patterns of the spread
of users for hate and religion, it provides strong similarity, while a circling set of users for both
contextual dimensions forming the cluster of likely outliers. To ensure that the users in these small
clusters are same users for both contextual dimensions, we have picked 10 random users from the
extremist user dataset and placed their representations in each contextual dimension on the 2-D
space. As shown in Figure 7 (right), users A and D fall far from other users forming an outlier
cluster for religion and hate contextual dimensions. We have repeated this procedure with different
sets of random 10 users multiple times, and found that the users in these small clusters are same,
which confirms our observations from Figure 7 (left). Therefore, we must identify these likely
outliers before creating our models.
Hierarchical Clustering: To identify the likely outliers in the extremist user dataset, we per-
form an unsupervised hierarchical density based clustering (HDBC) [20] over the 538 users in the
extremist dataset for each contextual dimension. HDBC forms clusters based on the euclidean dis-
tance between the users with respect to their representations for each of the contextual dimensions
of religion, ideology and hate. HDBC clustering reveals two main clusters, one of which forms the
majority of users, the Likely Extremist users, while the small cluster of users is the Likely Outliers.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of users over the two clusters, where the y axis represents the
percentage of users in each cluster for the dimensions of religion, ideology and hate.
Statistical Analysis: From the HDBC clustering, we identified 99 (18%), 48 (9%) and 141 (26%)
users in the extremist dataset, clustered as likely outliers for religion, ideology and hate contextual
dimensions, respectively. To confirm a clear separation between these two clusters along with its
statistical significance, we performed a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test for each contextual
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dimension. Table 4 shows the U-statistics (U-stats) and their p-values along with the effect size.
While all analyses reveal a significant difference, all effects are significant with moderate effect
sizes.
The effect size for ideology is slightly higher than that for the hate and the religion, implying
that ideology is more effective in clustering. This outcome suggests that the variance between the
content of the two clusters of users based on each dimension (especially ideology) is high; hence,
the users in these two clusters are significantly different from each other.
Figure 8. Based on the HDBC clustering algorithm, we
obtain two main clusters, and we call the majority cluster
as “Likely Extremist” and the small cluster as “Likely Out-
liers”. The y-axis represents the percentage of users for each
cluster. 141 hate, 99 religion, 48 ideology.
Dimension U -stats z-score p-value Effect
Size
Religion 5049 12.08 0.0027 0.53
Ideology 9566 13.95 0.001 0.61
Hate 8178 12.4 0.0016 0.54
Table 4. Non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test between
extremist users using their content representations from dif-
ferent dimensions. While outliers and likely extremist users
differ on all dimensions, the did not differ quite as much on
religion.
Validation: We created a random sample of 76 users comprising 15% of the extremist dataset, to
validate the two clusters for identified likely outliers and likely extremists. Our co-author domain
expert annotated these users as likely outliers, and likely extremist. We obtained a kappa score [40]
of 0.82, (69 correct and 7 incorrect matches).
Lastly, upon the validation of outliers by our co-author domain expert, we obtained the set of 49
outlier users in the extremist dataset. Content of the outlier users contains the following frequent
terms: marriage, Allah, bonded, silence, Islam leaders, Berjaya hilarious, cake, miss mit, kemaren,
Quran, Khuda, prophet, Muhammad, Ahmad. We found that these outlier users different from other
extremist users, and they are most likely non-extremist users. Keeping these outlier users in the
extremist user dataset will cause the model to unfairly classify non-extremist users as extremist,
which will create serious implications in a real world scenario. Hence, we remove this set of outlier
users from the dataset to be used in our modeling phase, yielding an extremist dataset with 489
users.
5.2 Imputation for Sparse Representations
Users on social media often use slang terms and informal language rather than the archaic language
used in religious and ideological resources. Moreover, some users use hateful language mixed with
religious terms, concepts, and topics in their content, while they do not share information related to
Islamist extremist ideology. On the other hand, some users mostly share ideological content while
they neither share religious content nor use hate speech. This situation creates sparse content of
users in any single dimension, translating to sparse embedding vectors (in some cases zero vectors).
We have identified 148 users who had relatively sparse contextual content for at least one of the
three dimensions.
Missing values in a dataset is a common problem, and statistical approaches have been developed
to approximate such missing components for numerical data. Similarly, natural language processing
addresses this problem through, such as out of vocabulary (OOV) [14] words found in domain-
specific applications [48].
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5.3 Modeling
Algorithm 1 Imputation for Extremist Users (E)
Input: Ψ, UˆE, UE, ΓE ▷ Set
of dimensions, Users with sparse vectors, All
users, Topic model, respectively.
1: function imputation(Ψ, UˆE, UE, ΓE)
2: for d in Ψ do
3: for uˆd in UˆE do
4: u˜d ← maxud ∈UdE
{
ΓE (uˆd )∩ΓE (ud )
ΓE (uˆd )∪ΓE (ud )
}
5: ®V(uˆd ) ← ®V(u˜d ) ▷ Equation 1
6: end for
7: end for
8: end function
We develop models employing different com-
binations (uni-bi-tri-dimensional) of the three
contextual dimensions (religion, ideology, hate)
to identify the best possible representation
of users for classification [36], and determine
the effectiveness and contribution of each di-
mension. We generate vector representations
of users (489 extremist users after removal
of outliers and 538 non-extremists users) for
each dimension, and concatenate them to cre-
ate uni-dimensional, bi-dimensional and tri-
dimensional models. Uni-dimensional models
include only the representation for one contex-
tual dimension, bi-dimensional models include
two dimensions and tri-dimensional model in-
clude all three dimensions. Then, for the bi-
dimensional and tri-dimensional models, we perform SVD to reduce the dimensionality of the
vector after concatenation, down to 300. Further, we perform our experiments developing models
with and without the imputed representations to assess the effectiveness of imputation for sparse
representation of users (see Section 5.2). For models without imputation, we eliminate users with
sparse representation, which correspond to removing 148 users from our dataset.
Our hypothesis is that a model with three dimensions will create more coherent representations
of users leading to improvements in the performance of classification. To test our hypothesis, we
create and compare models that include uni-dimensional (R, I, H), bi-dimensional (IH, RI, RH) and
tri-dimensional (RIH) models with and without imputation, apart from the baseline model (see
below).
Since the existing related work [27, 28] has utilized Random Forest (RF) and Naive Bayes (NB)
algorithms, we employ the same algorithms for a fair comparison. As we identified and removed
49 outliers from the extremist dataset (see Section 5.1), we start with 1027 users with imputation
and 879 users without imputation, and then create a hold-out dataset of 300 users. We perform
training using stratified 6-fold cross-validation. In Section 6, we report the results for our modeling
approach, discuss possible implications, and provide comparison with our baseline. We have chosen
the state-of-the-art baseline model defined in [27] which is grounded in social science models of
radicalization. Note that this is a modeling comparison using our dataset, described in Section 3.2.
They use a frequency-based weighting scheme with a NB model for dichotomous classification
over two levels (micro and meso). As we were unable to secure their proprietary resources (i.e.,
lexicon) used by [27], we made our best effort at replicating their approach on our dataset, for a
fair comparison.
6 RESULTS
In this section, we report the results on performance of the models we created using precision,
recall, F1-score and AUC metrics. From Table 5 and Figure 9, the baseline model has a precision
of 0.88, recall of 0.82 and F1-score of 0.84 using a feature size of 23K based on the frequency of
unigrams [27].
As shown in Table 5, RF models with imputation outperform others in precision, recall and
F1-score. Uni-dimensional models with imputation achieve a precision of 0.90 using only ideology,
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recall of 0.86 using only hate and F1-score of 0.87 with ideology and hate each. We observe that
the bi-dimensional model with the combination of religion and hate provides better precision,
recall and F1-score of 0.91, 0.90 and 0.91, respectively. The combination of ideology dimension
individually with the other two dimensions achieves a modest improvement (2.2%) in precision,
and a greater improvement (8.5%) in recall. The inclusion of ideology improves recall reducing false
negatives, and improving the identification of extremist users.
Figure 9. Precision and Recall of the models using Random Forest (RF) with and without imputation, based on different
combinations of contextual dimensions of religion (R), ideology (I) and hate (H). In general, the models with imputation
outperform other models without imputation. In (a), the tri-dimensional (RIH) model provides the best performance with
0.97 precision, and in (b) the bi-dimensional (RH) model provides best recall of 0.9, followed by the RIH model with 0.89.
When we combine the three contextual dimensions, our tri-dimensional model achieves best
performance with a precision of 0.97, a recall of 0.89 and an F1-score of 0.93, with imputation. Our
tri-dimension model improves the precision, recall and F1-score over the baseline model by 9.3%,
7.9%, 10.7%, respectively. On the other hand, the tri-dimensional model (RIH) improves precision
and F1-score over the bi-dimensional model (RH) by 6.6% and 2.2% respectively, at the expense
of a decrease of 1.1% in recall. Reducing misclassification of non-extremist users creates a minor
decrease in recall, which can be considered a trade-off for a significant improvement in precision,
with respect to a large set of non-extremist users. This trade-off between the tri-dimensional (RIH)
and bi-dimensional (RH) models in a real world application, translates as follows: while more (∼1%)
extremist users are mislabeled as non-extremist (false negatives), less (∼6%) non-extremist users
are mislabeled as extremist (false positives). As misclassification of non-extremist users can have
significant implications in a large-scale application where non-extremists vastly outnumber extremists,
the higher precision reduces potential social discrimination.
To better illustrate the diagnostic ability of these models, we plot ROC curves and compute AUC
scores where we can examine the performance of the models at different thresholds with respect to
true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR). Higher TPR with lower FPR indicates better
performance. When a model approaches 1.0 of TPR, the corresponding lower FPR at this point
compared to other models signifies better performance.
Figure 10 shows ROC curves for RF and NB models with different dimensions. Using RF, our
tri-dimensional model along with the bi-dimensional model RH, achieves the best performance with
AUC of 0.93, improving upon the baseline by 16.3%. Further, the ROC curve of the tri-dimensional
RF model converges to 1.0 of true positive rate (TPR) at the false positive rate (FPR) of 0.65, whereas
the tri-dimensional NB model reaches 1.0 of TPR at FPR of 0.82, implying a 10.9% gain in precision.
Moreover, using NB, our models with multiple contextual dimensions, except the uni-dimensional
model with religion, are outperforming the baseline in AUC (80%) by up to 12.5%. This shows the
effectiveness of our approach with contextual dimensions of Religion, Ideology and Hate, using
the same classifier, namely Naive Bayes. However, the bi-dimensional model RH provides the
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Dimension Algorithm Precision Recall F1-Score
w/o Imp w/ Imp w/o Imp w/ Imp w/o Imp w/ Imp
Baseline NB 0.88 – 0.82 – 0.84 –
Ideology (I) RF 0.89 0.90 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.87
Religion (R) RF 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.82 0.80 0.81
Hate (H) RF 0.84 0.88 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.87
I NB 0.80 0.88 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.81
R NB 0.70 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.76
H NB 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.83
I+H RF 0.88 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.89
I+R RF 0.84 0.90 0.87 0.89 0.86 0.89
R+H RF 0.85 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.91
I+H NB 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.86
I+R NB 0.86 0.89 0.81 0.87 0.83 0.88
R+H NB 0.81 0.92 0.80 0.84 0.80 0.88
R+I+H RF 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.93
R+I+H NB 0.90 0.91 0.82 0.82 0.86 0.87
Table 5. Results of the uni-bi-tri-dimensional models with and without imputation (Imp). The models without imputation
were created based on 879 users after the removal of 49 identified outlier users and 148 users with sparse representations
as described in section 5.1. The models with imputation were created based on the 1027 users after the removal of the 49
identified outlier users.
Figure 10. ROC curves and AUC scores of uni-bi-tri-dimensional models with RF and NB (Best seen in color). The RIH
tri-dimensional and RH bi-dimensional RF models outperform other models with an AUC score of 0.93. The ROC curve for
RIH converges to 1.0 at TPR earlier than the RH model, providing better precision. Note: The baseline approach involves
only NB and was not tested with RF.
best performance, with AUC of 0.90, followed by the two bi-dimensional models with RI and IH.
While the bi-dimensional model outperforms the tri-dimensional model, the ROC curve of the
tri-dimensional NB model converges to 1.0 of TPR at FPR of 0.83, whereas the bi-dimensional model
reaches the closest point to 1.0 of TPR at FPR of 0.97, implying a 9.8% gain in precision.
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Key Insights: (i) Ideology and hate dimensions are often coupled with religious concepts in
the content of extremist users. The inclusion of all three contextual dimensions displays the best
performance compared to other models in terms of precision. Specifically, this improvement is
important because it significantly reduces potential security implications of a possible deployment
of this model; thus, reducing the likelihood of an unfair mistreatment towards non-extremist
individuals, in a real world application. (ii) Considering that all three dimensions performing well,
different extremist users employ diverse strategies to effectively cover broader set of followers at
different levels of radicalization. Specifically, given that each of the three contextual dimensions
plays different roles in different levels of radicalization, tri-dimensional model captures nuances
as well as linguistic and semantic cues better with respect to different density of these contexts
throughout the radicalization process. (iii) The contextual dimensions of religion and hate had more
power in classification, suggesting that the extremist users were often using religious content along
with hate language. This maybe because they use religious concepts, events, places and historic
figures, to justify their hatred towards their targets, such as "apostates" or "the West", as in the
examples 2 and 3 in Table 1; they could encourage their followers to commit acts of violence.
7 CONCLUSION
Using a principled, multi-dimensional approach to the analysis of Islamist extremist content as
defined in social science, we excluded likely outlier non-extremist users to develop a robust classifier
with improved precision. The success of our method highlights the limitations of more superficial,
manual approaches to the identification of extremist users. Furthermore, it suggests a radicalization
process over time through a careful contextual metering approach involving religion, Islamist
extremist ideology and hate conversations, with fine granularity.
We improved upon the state-of-the-art in automated classification using the three contextual
dimensions of Islamist extremism on social media and learned three domain-specific embedding
models for interpreting content shared by the users. Overall, our comprehensive approach achieved
10.2%, 8.5% and 10.7% improvement in precision, recall and F1-score, respectively, over a competing
baseline. We make the dataset and domain specific corpora for the three dimensions available upon
request for research and reproducibility purposes.
Limitations and Future work: The limited number of labeled instances available for training
may fail to track the changing nature of concepts and relationships. We plan to address the dynamic
nature of this problem in our future work. Specifically, as the past data may not be representative
of the future dynamic changes, we will explore the use of domain-specific knowledge of the
radicalization process and progression to make our analysis less fragile.
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